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DENIAL OF PRISONERS' CLAIMS UNDER THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT*
Two obstacles have traditionally confronted the prisoner who sues his
government for injuries sustained through the negligence of prison personnel.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity insulates the state from liability for the
torts of its agents.1 And the doctrine of civil death, which abrogates certain
of a prisoner's rights during his confinement, may suspend his standing to
sue.2 Federal prisoners, however, now face neither barrier. By enacting the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the United States has waived its sovereign
immunity.3 And civil death, not operative unless set forth by statute,4 does
not apply to prisoners under federal sentence.0
The recent case of Signon v. United States 6 nevertheless denied a federal
prisoner a right of action against the Federal Government. Invoking the FTCA,
Sigmon sued for injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of a prison em-
ployee who supervised Sigmon's work in a prison industry program.7 Al-
*Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
1. HARPER, LAW OF TORTs 658 (1933) ; PROSsER, ToRTS 1064-6 (1941). This doctrine
has confronted prisoners in, e.g., Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71, 48 Am. Rep. 607 (1884) ;
Clodfelter v. State, 86 N.C. 51, 41 Am. Rep. 440 (1882). See also, Moffat v. State, 116
Misc. 8, 11-12, 189 N.Y. Supp. 360, 362 (Ct. Cl. 1921). But cf. Hillman v. Anniston, 214
Ala. 522, 108 So. 539 (1926) (city has no immunity while (pursuing proprietary rather
than governmental activities, and therefore held liable for death of prison inmate).
2. E.g., Lipschultz v. State, 192 Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948) ; Green v.
State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938), affirming 251 App. Div. 108, 295 N.Y. Supp.
672 (4th Dep't 1937). But a prisoner may sue the state while on parole. Duffy v. State,
197 Misc. 569, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Ct. Cl. 1950). And he may sue the state after being
pardoned but before the time at which his term would have ended. Application of White,
166 Misc. 481,2 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
For a comprehensive treatment and criticism of the civil death doctrine, see Legis,, 50
HARv. L. Rxv. 968 (1937). See also, Notes, 26 GEO. L.J. 1051 (1938); 34 VA. L. REv.
959 (1948) ; 34 id. 463 (1948) ; 21 id. 232 (1934). Suggestions for circumventing convicts'
civil disabilities are made in Note, 48 YALE L.J. 912 (1939).
3. See 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (Supp. 1952).
4. Holmes v. King. 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927); Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns.
Ch. 118 (N.Y. 1822). See, e.g., Quick v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 207 Ala. 376, 377, 92
So. 608, 609 (1922) ; Musgrave v. McManus, 24 N.M. 227, 231, 173 Pac. 196, 197 (1918);
Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 732, 139 Pac. 948, 949 (1914). See also, Legis.,
50 HARv. L. REv. 968,969-70 (1937).
For examples of civil death statutes, see 3 AaRz, CODE ANN., tit. 43, § 6116 (1939);
CAL. PEN. CODE §§2600-1 (Deering, 1949); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 510 (McKinney, 1944).
Approximately one-third of the states have similar provisions.
5. Presbury v. Hull, 34 Mo. 29 (1863). See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th
Cir. 1944) ; Hardin v. Dodd, 176 Ga. 119, 123, 167 S.E. 277, 279 (1932).
6. 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
7. Plaintiff alleged that a Government employee had negligently instructed him to
use an emery wheel which the Government employee knew to be in a dangerous state of
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though Sigmon was not civilly dead and although the Government had waived
immunity, the court held that the FTCA did not render the United States
liable for a prisoner's injuries.8
To reach its decision, Sigmon adapted the four-fold rationale of Feres v.
United States,9 in which members of the armed forces were denied recovery
under the FTCA for injuries received "incident to service" and resulting
from the negligence of others in the armed forces.10 One premise of Feres was
that the effect of the FTCA was not to create new rights of action, but merely
to allow suit against the Government in situations where an individual would
have been liable before the Act's passage. Applying this principle, and tacitly
postulating that a prisoner never had an action against an individual jailer,
the Signion court concluded that the FTCA did not authorize recovery by
federal prisoners." Secondly, Sigmon stressed the existence of a statutory
compensation fund for prisoners like the plaintiff, injured while working in
Federal Prison Industries.' 2 The congressional intent underlying the com-
pensation provision was construed to be part of an overall desire to treat federal
prisoners uniformly.' 3 But the FTCA males substantive liability dependent
on local law.' 4 Extending an argument made in Feres, the court reasoned
that Congress intended to preserve uniformity by making the Prison Industry
compensation plan the prisoner's sole remedy, to the exclusion of an action
under the FTCA.15 Drawing a third analogy to the situation involved in the
Feres case, Sigmon maintained that permitting federal prisoners to bring
FTCA suits would have detrimental effects on discipline.' 0 Finally, following
Feres, the court pointed out that the FTCA makes the United States "liable
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
disrepair, and that as a result of the negligent instructions and the negligent condition of
the emery wheel, the plaintiff was cut by an a%, while undertaldng to sharpen it. Id. at 907.
S. Id. at 907-03,911.
9. 340 U.S. 135 (1950), affirming Feres v. United States, 177 F2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949),
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), and re-vrsing Griggs v. United
States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
10. Fetes filled in the gap left one year earlier by the Supreme Court when it held in
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), that injuries sustained by members of the
armed forces while on furlough, because of the negligence of other members of the armed
forces, were a proper basis for claim under the FTCA. The Brooks Court had reserved
opinion on injuries suffered "incident to service." See id. at 52.
11. Sigion v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 905, 909 (W.D. Va. 1953), quoting Jeffer-
son v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd msb norn. Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
12. Sigmon v. United States, supra note 11, at 903, citing 62 STAT. 852 (1948), as
amended, 63 STAT. 99 (1949), IS U.S.C. § 4126 (Supp. 1952).
13. Sigmon v. United States, supra note 11, at 903-11.
14. 60 SrAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1952).
15. Sigmion v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 905, 903 (W.D. Va. 1953).
16. Id. at 910, quoting Jefferson v. United States, 178 F2d 518, 519 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff'd sub izom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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circumstances."'1 7 That provision, plus the fact that "no private individual
has the legal right to hold any other private individual in penal servitude," 18
also convinced the Sigmon court that the Act does not support a prisoner's
claim.
The rationale of the Sigmon decision would seem to deny an action to a
federal prisoner under any circumstances.) 9 Three of the court's four grounds
are equally applicable to prisoners injured on jobs outside the Federal Prison
Industries program, and to any prisoner injured while not at work.20 More-
over, the Feres decision, on which the court so heavily relies, dealt with injuries
sustained in a barracks fire 21 and injuries resulting from negligent treatment
in army hospitals,22 and not with harm suffered in occupational pursuits.
Since the FTCA was designed as a general waiver of sovereign immunity,23
the result in Sigmon is surprising. Nothing in the legislative history of the
Act suggests that Congress intended to exclude an inmate's right of action.2"
In addition, the Act expressly excludes from its coverage certain claims,2 1
but not prisoners' claims. Therefore, by application of the expressio unius
doctrine,26 the Act would not be deemed to deny prisoners a right of action.
In the absence of compelling reasons, Sigrnon's result seems unjustified.'
17. Sigmon v. United States, supra note 15, at 910, quoting 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952).
18. Sigmon v. United States, supra note 15, at 910.
19. In Sigmon v. United States, supra note 15, at 908, the court indicated that it
might allow a claim arising from a situation like that in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S.
49 (1949). See note 10 supra. However, it is unlikely that this type of situation would
face a prisoner. Conceivably, a prisoner on parole could be injured in a situation comparable
to Brooks.
20. The exception is the court's stress on the existence of a statutory compensation fund
for prisoners injured in Federal Prison Industries. See text at notes 12-14 supra.
21. A defective heating plant and inadequate fire watch were alleged. Feres v. United
States, 177 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
22. A towel 30 inches by 18 inches, marked "Medical Department U.S. Army," was
found in Jefferson's stomach. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 709 (D. Md.
1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub noun. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950). It was alleged that Griggs had been negligently treated by army surgeons.
Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub noin. Feres v. United
States, supra.
23. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 536 (1947). There it is pointed out that "[d]omi-
nant contemporary opinion approves increased relaxations of [governmental] immunity...."
Id. at 537.
24. Committee reports and hearings make no reference to any exception in the Act
which would deny an action to prisoners.
25. 60 STAT. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §2680 (Supp. 1952). For a discussion
of these exceptions, see Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 542-9 (1947).
26. Feres discussed the expressio ,unius doctrine but refused to apply it. Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 138-9 (1950). Its treatment of the language of the Act has been
criticized. See note 27 infra.
27. For similar criticisms of Feres, see Note, 30 B.U.L. REiv. 285, 287 (1930), quoting
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28,
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Two of the court's reasons apply as well in Signion as they did in Fores,
but are impressive in neither context. The court's fear that allowing prisoners
to sue the Government will damage discipline seems exaggerated.2 Prisoners,
usually unschooled in the law and ill-prepared to pay for professional advice,
could hardly be expected to flood the courts with litigation. And regard-
less of the FTCA, a prisoner apparently can sue the negligent prison em-
ployee.30 If anything, it would serve discipline better to divert the prisoner
toward seeking compensation from the impersonal Government. Secondly,
it seems erroneous to reason that since the Government can be liable only as
a private individual would be and since no individual may hold another in
penal servitude, the prisoner has no claim against the United States.31 An in-
mate lives and labors under hazards duplicated in the outside world. Sigmon
was injured while operating defective equipment in a machine shop-a situa-
tion comparable to those constantly arising in private industry.3 12
Sigm on's other arguments-its principal ones-may have had validity in
Feres, where they originated; but they are not applicable in the present con-
text. Even if the FTCA encompasses only those rights of action recognized
29-30 (1926): "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction
where consent has been announced." See also Note, 99 U. oF. PA. L RE%. 102Z, 1025 (1951) :
"It hardly seems the function of the Court to abrogate the plain provisions of an Act of
Congress on the assumption that Congress doesn't mean what it says:' For a contrary
view, see Note, 24 So. CALi. L. RE. 502, 504 (1951).
28. For a criticism addressed to Fetes, see Note, 40 Ky. L.J. 438, 443 (1952).
29. In addition, prison personnel would not be deterred from decisive disciplinary
action, because claims based on discretionary acts, as opposed to ministerial acts, are ex-
pressly excepted from the Act. 60 STAT. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §26 0(a)
(Supp. 1952). See Note, 14 A.L.R2d 353, 356-S (1950); Note, 50 CoL. L Rv. 827, 832
(1950).
30. E.g., Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Goben, 94 Fed. 48 (Ind. Cir. 1S99) (inadequate pro-
tection from mob); Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (5th Cir. 1892) (same) ; Mangenheimer
v. State, 120 Ind. App. 128, 90 N.E2d 813 (1950) (food poisoning) ; Ex tarte Jenkins,
25 Ind. App. 532, 58 N.E. 560 (1900) (inadequate protection from mob); Smith v. Miller,
241 Iowa 625, 40 NAV.2d 597 (1950) (suffocation because of burning mattress) ; O'Dell
v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W.2d 906 (1948) (suffocation caused by fire); Hixon v.
Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897) (whipped by "kangaroo court") ; Kusah v. Me-
Corkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918) (stabbed by another prisoner). Contra.,
Haberger v. Carver, 297 Mass. 435, 9 N.E.2d 305 (1937) (auto accident outside of prison
while under custody of prison guard) ; O'Hare v. Jones, 161 Mass. 391, 37 N._ 371 (1894)
(industrial accident) ; Williams v. Adams, 3 Allen 171 (Mass. 1861) (unhealthy living
conditions).
31. For a similar criticism directed at Feres, see Note, 40 Ky. L.J. 438, 441 (1952).
32. This similarity was recognized in Gould v. State, 196 Misc. 48,, 491, 92 ,.Y.S2d
251, 254 (Ct_ Cl. 1949). A New York prisoner was injured in an industrial operation,
because of the negligence of the state in failing to provide safety instructions. The court
applied the standards of the New York Labor Law, saying: "In appraising the State's
negligence.., the standards which it has created for others by its statutes and rules may
very properly be applied."
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before its enactment, 33 the prisoner had an action which the serviceman did not
possess. Although suit may not lie between servicemen, 4 prison personnel
have been held liable to prisoners in their custody.8 This liability has stemmed
from both statutory and common law duties to protect their charges from
harm.36 An action, then, does exist for prisoners. And since the FTCA waives
sovereign immunity, the action should lie against the United States. 7
Stretching an argument made in Feres, the Signion court concluded that
Congress intended the Federal Prison Industries compensation system to be
the prisoner's sole means of recovery.3 8 But where Congress has intended
33. See note 11 ntpra and accompanying text.
34. Mr. Justice Jackson stated in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950)
"We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negli-
gence [from] . . . superior officers ... ." For an earlier view, see Note, 50 COL. L. REv.
827, 830 (1950) ("[Olne soldier can sue another for an injury resulting from a negligent
act of the latter while in the line of duty. . . ."), citing DicaY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
286 (9th ed. 1939), and WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 885 (2d ed. 1920).
35. See note 30 mpra and accompanying text.
36. See cases cited note 30 mspra.
37. It is highly conjectural whether or not federal prisoners in Massachusetts could
recover even if the FTCA were applied to federal prisoners. The FTCA states that the
United States shall be liable under circumstances in which "a private person . . . would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent]
act or omission occurred." 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp.
1952). The socially archaic Massachusetts rule stands alone in providing no recovery for
a prisoner against prison personnel, when the former is injured by the latter's negligent
performance of a ministerial act. See cases cited note 30 supra. If a court were to apply
the FTCA to a federal prisoner in Massachusetts, it might do one of three things. (1) It
might deny recovery, applying to federal prisoners the Massachusetts law concerning state
prisoners. (2) It might allow recovery, ignoring contrary Massachusetts cases and relying
solely on favorable federal precedent. See Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (5th Cir. 1892).
This could be rationalized on the ground that state law concerning state prisoners is not
relevant to the relationship of a federal prisoner to federal prison officials. (3) It might
allow recovery, holding that the statutory phrase "private person" means any private
individual-not necessarily a jailer-who causes a similar injury (in Sigmon, i.e., a super-
visor in a machine shop). In all three instances, the substantive state law concerning
negligence (except for the existence of a duty of care), contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, respondeat superior, etc., would of course apply.
In any event, the problem is not too acute. Although some federal prisoners are
quartered in local jails, REP. FEDERAL BuREAu OF PISONS 5 (1952), and presumably a
few of these would be in Massachusetts, there is no federal penal institution in that state,
Id. at iii.
38. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Va. 1953).
The Court in Feres stated that the failure of Congress to adjust the service compen-
sation remedy to the FTCA was evidence that the FTCA was not designed to apply to
service personnel. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). And the Court relied
on the comprehensiveness of the service compensation system as further evidence that
Congress did not intend the FTCA to apply. Id. at 140. But the Feres case left untouched
Brooks' holding that the service compensation plan was not exclusive. Brooks v. United
States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). All that Feres did was to interpret the scope of the FTCA.
Signion, however, shifted emphasis to the compensation system. It began with the idea
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a compensation system to be exclusive, it has said so in the governing statuteco
Here, neither the legislative history nor the compensation statute itself provides
evidence to support the court's theory of exclusiveness.40 Furthermore, in
compensation statutes which embody e-xclusive remedies, Congress has given
claimants rights not granted in the prison compensation plan. For instance,
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act sets rigid standards which mathe-
matically determine the amount of recovery,4 ' while under the prison system
"the amount of the award is entirely within the discretion of the Attorney-
General."4 2 By the same token, the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
affords procedural safeguards not enumerated in the Prison Industries plan.Y
Hence, the prison compensation system apparently was not intended to be
exclusive. If an action were permitted under the FTCA, any amount actually
received under the compensation plan could of course be used to mitigate
damages.s
Acceptance of Sigmon's contention, that recovery under the FTCA must
be denied because the prison compensation plan was designed to be a uniform
and exclusive remedy, 45 will lead to inequity. Unlike the service compensation
that Congress intended the prison compensation plan to be exclusive; from that it deduced
that the FTCA could not apply. See Sigmon v. United States, supra.
39. See provisions of: Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 63 STAT. S65 (1949),
5 U.S.C. §757(b) (Supp. 1952); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1946). See also Brooks v. United States, 337
U.S. 49, 53 (1949) : 'Ve Will not call either remedy in the present case exclusive...
when Congress has not done so." Cf. Note, 48 MicH. L. Rlv. 534, 535-6 (1950) : "(Ale-
ceptance of benefits accruing because of a person's status as a member of the armed forces
or as a government employee should not bar right of suit where such benefits are not
granted because of any fault on the part of the government, but merely following an ad-
ministrative determination that a certain percentage disability has been suffered. Such
payments ... should not be regarded as a binding election of remedy barring the right to
sue...."
40. Committee hearings and reports indicate no congressional desire to make the plan
exclusive.
41. 63 STAT. 855 et seq. (1949), 5 U.S.C. §§ 752-6(a), 760-3 ,Suop. 1952).
42. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL. from R. J. LaVallee, Secretary of
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., dated September 24, 1953, in Yale Law Library. An award
under the prison compensation plan may not exceed the amount provided by the FECA,
but no minimum standards are set. 62 STAT. 852 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 99 (1949),
18 U.S.C. § 4126 (Supp. 1952).
There have been approximately 100 awards made from the Fund, running from $50 for
loss of a finger to $4000 for death. Communication to the Y=X. LAW, Jou AL, supro.
43. Examples of safeguards found in the FECA but lacking in the prison compensation
system are: opportunity for administrative review, 39 STT. 749 (1916), as amended, 5
U.S.C. § 787 (1946), and the claimant's privilege of having a personal physician pre-ent at
the physical exammination, id. § 771. Furthermore, compensation under the prisojn plan is
,permissive rather than mandatory. 62 STAT. 852 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 99 (1949),
18 U.S.C. § 4126 (Supp. 1952).
44. Cf. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49,53-4 (1949).
45. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 903, 911 (W.D. Va. 1953).
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system involved in the Feres case,46 the prison plan is not comprehensive.
It is available only to those prisoners injured while working in Federal Prison
Industries.4 7 More than two-thirds of the federal prison population is not in
the Industry program. 48 Furthermore, those prisoners eligible for compensa-
tion are entitled to relief only for those injuries suffered at their jobs.40 To
be sure, the FTCA's reliance on local law o will preclude uniformity, but non-
uniformity is preferable to an arbitrary denial of any remedy at all.51
All federal prisoners are peculiarly entitled to an action under the FTCA.
State courts, in jurisdictions having waiver of immunity statutes, have allowed
inmates a right of action for injuries sustained in prison.52 The prisoner is
46. 38 U.S.C. § 700 et seq. (1946, Supp. 1952). The service compensation plan affords
comprehensive relief for virtually all service sustained injuries. See Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135,145 (1950).
47. FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INC., INMATE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REGULATIONS
(Aug., 1950) (copy on file in Yale Law Library); Communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Ray D. Nester, Safety Engineer of Bureau of Prisons, dated October 30, 1953
in Yale Law Library.
48. "About two-thirds of our prisoners are employed at farm work, on road construc-
tion and forestry operations, on construction projects, and at the many tasks incident to the
operation and maintenance of the institutions. About twelve percent are unemployable
including the sick, the aged, those with serious physical or mental handicaps, those newly
committed, and those in transit from one institution to another.
"The work program for the remaining prisoners is provided by Federal Prison Indus-
tries, Inc. . . ." RE. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 23 (1952). There are approximately
20,000 federal prisoners. Id. at 5.
49. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
51. The Siginon case denied recovery to a prisoner injured in a Federal Prison In-
dustry, and there a prisoner has another remedy. However the rationale of the decision
would seem to deny an action to federal prisoners under circumstances in which they have
no other remedy. See page 420 supra.
52. E.g., Moore v. State, Civil No. 4068, Ct. Cl. Ill., 1948 (unsafe food grinder);
Washington v. State, 277 App. Div. 1079, 100 N.Y.S.2d 620 (3d Dep't 1950) (negligence
of another convict imputed to state) ; McCrossen v. State, 277 App. Div. 1160, 101 N.Y.S.2d
591 (4th Dep't 1950) (negligent medical treatment) ; King v. State, 202 Misc. 868, 117
N.Y.S.2d 386 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (inadequate instruction in operation of blow torch) ; Nunnally
v. State, 197 Misc. 764, 94 N.Y.S2d 882 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (inmate injured in fall on soapy
stairs) ; Gould v. State, 196 Misc. 488, 92 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (failure to give safety
instructions and equipment) ; Kurtz v. State, 183 Misc. 991, 52 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Ct. Cl. 1944)
(fall off icy terrace).
The penal codes of New York and Illinois afford no prison compensation procedure
similar to that provided for in the federal provision. But the presence of a partial and
therefore inadequate compensation system does not materially distinguish the two situations.
In New York, because of the state's civil death provisions, N.Y. PEN. LAw § 510
(McKinney, 1944), suit will not lie while the inmate is in prison. See note 2 supra and
accompanying text. But the statute of limitations poses no problem. See N.Y. Cr. CL. Acr
§ 10(5) (1947), providing that a claimant under a legal disability may present his claim with-
in two years after such disability is removed. Furthermore, a private enabling act may
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less able to protect himself from another's negligence than is a private individual.
He must live and work under conditions imposed on him,5a and he cannot
readily question the instructions of those entrusted with his care and super-
vision. Moreover, a permanently disabled prisoner with no financial resources
cannot be expected to return to society as a useful and well-behaved person.
On the contrary, he may well revert to crime in an attempt to survive. In the
face of the Signion decision, the courts or Congress should affirmatively indi-
cate that the FTCA applies to federal prisoners.
permit an inmate to sue while in prison, since the right which it gives is not one of those
"civil rights" denied prisoners by the civil death statute. Tomaselli v. State, 163 Misc. 624,
6 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
But prisoners under federal sentence suffer no civil disabilities. See note 5 stpra and
accompanying text. Hence, if an action lies for a federal prisoner, it should lie whether
he is in or out of prison. This is especially important. If recovery were p-,rmitted under
the FTCA, but at the same time the federal courts invoked a civil death doctrine by judi-
cial fiat, many prisoners would be barred from recovery by the statute of limitations. 62
STAT. 971 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 62 (1949), 2S U.S.C. §2401(b) (Supp. 1952).
Since the federal statute grants no period of grace, the limitations period would run against
disabled persons during their incapacity.
53. "Prison discipline means, conventionally, the regulation or attempt at regulation
of all the details of the life of the prisoner by means of rules. The prisoner is pcrnfttcd to
do nothing except under direction of the officers of the prison.' SUTHERLANW, PnMI5 PLES
oF CiaixroLomY 410 (1934) (emphasis added).
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